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ALD-085        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3275 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT # 3 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00572) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 21, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 8, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se Appellant Matthew Jones appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
lawsuit alleging various criminal and constitutional violations against Justice of the Peace 
Court No. 3, in Georgetown, Delaware (“Justice of the Peace Court”).  As the appeal 
lacks an arguable basis in law, we will dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
I. 
Jones alleged in his complaint that he was subjected to enslavement, malicious 
prosecution, fraudulent medical diagnosis, sexual slavery, forced labor, identity theft, 
larceny, forgery, assault, attempted murder, rape, pedophilia, and other felonious acts.  
Jones alleged that the acts stem from his mother's call to 911 on December 31, 2014, and 
his subsequent arrest for felony assault.  Jones further stated that he was taken to Sussex 
County Correctional Institute, and held without bail. Ultimately, he noted, the case was 
dismissed.  The complaint additionally referred to a number of traffic incidents that 
occurred between 2002 and 2006, and Jones requested two billion dollars in damages.   
 The District Court dismissed Jones’s case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) 
and (iii) on the grounds that the Justice of the Peace Court, a state entity, was immune 
from suit, and that Jones’s claims were frivolous.  Finally, the District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and 
concluded that amendment of Jones’s complaint would be futile.  Jones timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) requires us to dismiss an appeal that 
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lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 
2006) (per curiam).  An appeal that is based on “an indisputably meritless legal theory” is 
appropriate for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  See Deutsch v. United 
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of the suit on the basis that the Justice 
of the Peace Court is a Delaware state entity; indeed, Jones’s appeal is indisputably 
meritless.  The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The Amendment protects states 
as well as their agencies and departments from suit in federal court.  Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).  A state agency or department is 
characterized as an “arm of the state,” and is also entitled to immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment, when a judgment against it “would have had essentially the same 
practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself.”  Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
Whether an agency is entitled to sovereign immunity is determined by balancing 
three factors: (1) whether the payment of the judgment would come from the state 
treasury; (2) what status the entity has under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy 
the entity has.  Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659).   
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The Delaware Constitution vests the State’s judicial power in “a Supreme Court, a 
Superior Court, a Court of Chancery, a Family Court, a Court of Common Pleas, a 
Register’s Court, Justices of the Peace, and such other courts as the General Assembly [] 
shall have by law established[.]”  Del. Const. art. IV § 1 (emphasis added).  Moreover, 
the constitution provides that “Justices of the Peace [] shall be appointed by the 
Governor, by and with the consent of a majority of all the Members elected to the Senate, 
for such terms as shall be fixed this Constitution or by law.”  Del. Const. art. IV § 30.  
Accordingly, the Justice of the Peace Court is not independent of the State and cannot be 
regarded as having significant autonomy from it.  See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 
426 F.3d. 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that Pennsylvania's First Judicial 
District is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).  And, in light of the 
Justice of the Peace Court’s relationship with the State, “it is undeniable that [Delaware] 
is the real party interest in [this] suit and would be subjected to both indignity and an 
impermissible risk of legal liability if the suit were allowed to proceed.”  Id. at 241. 
Therefore, we agree with the District Court that the Justice of the Peace Court is 
immune from damages under the Eleventh Amendment.  We also agree with the District 
Court that dismissal is proper because Delaware is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989).  
Consequently, Jones’s claims could not proceed against the Justice of the Peace Court, 
the sole defendant.  
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We perceive no error in the District Court’s decision to deny Jones leave to amend 
his complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Also, given the foregoing, the District Court did not err in declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015).  Because Jones has no arguable 
legal basis on which to appeal the District Court’s order, we will dismiss the appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).1 
                                              
1 We note that when the District Court issued its opinion, we had already held in another 
of Jones’s cases that a different Justice of the Peace Court in Delaware was entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity – and that the style of our analysis suggested we would 
reach the same result in a suit against any of Delaware’s Justice of the Peace Courts.  We 
caution Jones against bringing baseless repetitive appeals.  See Fed. R. App. P. 38 
(sanctions); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179-80 (1991) (curtailment of in forma pauperis 
privileges). 
